

Economia da Educação

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
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Intergenerational Social Mobility in OECD Countries*

by
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Figure 3. Ratio of the chance of being in the top wage quartile for sons of higher-educated vs. lower-educated fathers:¹ Selected European OECD countries




Note: Germany is not included in this figure as there is a problem with the representativeness of the German sample along the education dimension.

- This figure shows the ratio of two conditional probabilities. It measures the ratio between the probability to end up in the top wage quartile given that the son's father had achieved tertiary education and the probability to end up in the top wage quartile given that the son's father had achieved less than upper-secondary education. Probabilities are defined as simple frequency measures. Fathers' educational achievement is a proxy for parental background or wages.
- 25-34 years old for Portugal.

Source: OECD calculations based on the 2005 EU-SILC Database.

Figure 4. Wage premium and penalty due to paternal education levels:¹ Selected European OECD countries



Notes: * denotes statistically significant at 10% at least.
 ** denotes statistically significant at 5% at least.
 Germany is not included in this figure, as there is a problem with the representativeness of the German sample along the education dimension.

- The figure shows the estimated percentage change in wages of the offspring depending on their parental background measured by father's highest education level. The wage premium is the increase in the offspring's wage of having a father with tertiary education relative to an offspring whose father had upper-secondary education. The wage penalty is the decrease in the offspring's wage of having a father with less than upper-secondary education relative to an offspring whose father had upper-secondary education. Fathers' educational achievement is a proxy for parental background or wage.
- Based on OLS wage regression model.
- Based on wage regression model with selection into paid employment (Heckman full maximum likelihood estimation).

Source: OECD calculations based on the 2005 EU-SILC Database.

High Educ
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Unfairness in access to higher education: a 11 year comparison of grade inflation by private and public secondary schools in Portugal

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Table 2 Differences between internal and national exams' scores by school type (regular public schools, TEIP public schools, government-dependent private schools, and independent private schools)

Year	Public		Private		Total
	Regular	TEIP	Gov dependent	Independent	
2001/2	2.71		3.03	3.06	2.75
2002/3	2.65		2.75	2.96	2.69
2003/4	3.02		2.88	3.12	3.03
2004/5	2.65		2.48	2.69	2.65
2005/6	3.31		3.28	3.52	3.33
TOTAL *(2001/2–2005/6)	2.89		2.89	3.08	2.91
2006/7		3.14		3.20	3.15
	3.13	3.51	3.12	3.28	
2007/8		2.28		2.18	2.27
	2.27	2.73	2.09	2.27	
2008/9		2.72		2.66	2.71
	2.71	3.17	2.56	2.77	
2009/10		2.82		2.63	2.80
	2.81	3.33	2.44	2.83	
2010/11		3.10		2.76	3.06
	3.08	3.69	2.57	2.94	
2011/12		3.57		3.56	3.57
	3.56	4.01	3.25	3.82	
Total *(2006/7–2011/12)		2.95		2.85	2.94
	2.94	3.48	2.68	3.03	
Total *(2001/2–2011/12)		2.92		2.97	2.93
	2.91**	3.48	2.79	3.17	




Fig. 1 Differences between internal and national exams' scores by school type (regular public schools, government-dependent private schools, and independent private schools) across results on national exams (2001/2–2011/12)




Fig. 2 Differences between internal and national exams' scores by school type (regular public schools, TEIP public schools, government-dependent private schools, and independent private schools) across results on national exams (2006/7–2011/12)




Fig. 3 Differences between internal and national exams' scores relative to the average difference by school type (regular public schools, government-dependent private schools, and independent private schools) across results on national exams (2001/2–2011/12)




Fig. 4 Differences between internal and national exams' scores relative to the average difference by school type (regular public schools, TEIP public schools, government-dependent private schools, and independent private schools) across results on national exams (2006/7–2011/12)




Fig. 5 Average of the differences by (the 20) classes of scores in national exams (2001/2–2011/12)




Fig. 6 Weighted average of the differences by (the 20) classes of scores in national exams (2001/2–2011/12)

as 1 score point (out of 20). To get a tangible notion of the impact that these differences can have on a student's access to higher education, it is best to look at a real example. Medicine is one of the (if not *the*) most wanted, prestigious, and consequently difficult to access courses in Portuguese public higher education (Fonseca and Encarnação 2012). In the current year (2012/13), the last student to access the Medicine course at the University of Porto had an application score of 18.35 points (out of 20). This placed him in position 504 in the access ranking. It needs to be said that only 245 places were available. The fact that the student in position 504 ended up gaining access is explained by the fact that, as students can apply to a maximum of six programme/institution pairs, students in better positions ended up enrolling in other courses (most likely, other Medicine courses closer to home). If we add and subtract half a score point (0.5 out of 20) to the application score of the last candidate to enter the course (18.35), we get 18.85 and 17.85. These scores correspond to positions 182 and 705, respectively; i.e., more than 300 places above and 200 places below the last candidate to gain access. If we take 1 score point (out of 20), we get 19.35 and 17.35, which correspond respectively to positions 33 and 806; i.e., almost 500 places above and 300 places below the last candidate to gain access. As this example illustrates, in a context of fierce competition for the scarce places available, this (apparently small) boost in student's scores can actually have a huge impact on their chances of accessing higher education, or at least their chosen study programme.

We can think of three ways of dealing with this problem: (1) to stop using internal scores as a factor determining access to higher education, (2) to make some kind of a posteriori correction to the scores attributed by schools, or (3) to resort to the luck of draw (Stone 2013). To be sure, none of these options is exempt from criticism. Yet, in the face of a system that has relevant flaws, it seems reasonable to consider other options, and ethically mandatory to start a discussion on how to end or minimize the unfair consequences of Portugal's current higher education access policies.